Read the actual sources.

The 2026 Billionaire Tax Act imposes a one-time 5% excise tax on net worth ≥$1B for California residents on Jan 1 2026, valued Dec 31 2026.

Independent fiscal-impact estimate. As of last check the LAO had not yet posted its specific analysis for Initiative 25-0024. The linked index page is the canonical destination; once posted, the document will appear there with the AG file number 25-0024.

Argues the headline 5% rate understates true effective burden once cap-gains-on-liquidation, voting-rights premium under §50303(c)(3)(C), book-value × 7.5 multiplier, and the 7.5% installment deferral are included. Per-founder effective rates: Tony Xu 173%, David Baszucki 59%, Brin/Page 37%, Zuckerberg 36%, Huang 8%.

Estimates $3.53B–$4.49B per year in ongoing state revenue loss from billionaire departures, in net-present-value terms outweighing the one-time tax.

Uses 51.6% migration response derived from Brülhart et al; central paper Walczak builds on.

Argues the response should be modeled at ~10% all-channel avoidance, treating the levy as one-time per its plain text.

The proponent-aligned legal team's full economic and constitutional defense of the Act, written before the rebuttal cycle. Cited in Walczak (2026).

Targeted defense of the §50303(c)(3)(C) voting-rights premium that Walczak's per-founder effective-rate table treats as the central distortion.

Argues that even a one-time levy creates expectations of repeated levies; behavioral responses are conditioned on perceived repeatability, not just statutory text.

Independent academic analysis of the closest-connections residency test as it applies to the §50308(n) tax obligation date.

Constitutional and administrative case for state-level wealth taxation. Cited in the Act's findings (v).

Source of the 24% all-tax rate for billionaires vs 30% average taxpayer. Cited in Act findings (s) and in the Walczak paper.

Neutral aggregate of the campaign, donors, polling, and endorsements as updated.